Education and Social Cohesion: Re-Centering the Debate by Green, A & Preston, J
Education and Social Cohesion: Re-Centring the Debate
Draft for Peabody Journal of Education and Development
Andy Green and John Preston
Abstract:  Social Capital theory has tended to treat social cohesion as a mere aggregation of individual and 
community level characteristics, ignoring the long tradition of theory on social solidarity and social cohesion at  
the societal level. However, the key indicators of social capital – associational membership and social trust – do  
not  co-vary  cross  nationally  and  societies  rich  in  community  level  social  capital  are  not  always  cohesive  
societies.  Social  capital  and societal  cohesion  are  not  necessarily  the  same thing  and  education  may have 
different effects on each. This article seeks to put the analysis of education and societal cohesion back in the 
centre of the picture. We do this firstly through a critical review of some of the existing literature on education  
and social capital which points to the limitations of individual level analysis of what are fundamentally societal 
issues.  Secondly,  we  outline  some  alternative  models  for  understanding  how  education  impacts  on  social  
cohesion in different societies, drawing on an analysis of some of the aggregated cross-national data on skills, 
income distribution and various indicators of social cohesion. The argument suggests some causal mechanisms 
for the social impacts of education that are quite different from those which normally underpin arguments about  
human and social capital.   
Education is a powerful generator of social capital. According to recent research on the USA, 
Italy and the UK (eg Emler and Frazer, 1999; Hall, 1999; Nie et al, 1996; Putman, 1995; 
2000),  more  educated  individuals  tend  to  join  more  voluntary associations,  show greater 
interest  in politics and take part in more political  activities.  They are also more likely to 
express  trust  in  others  (social  trust)  and in  institutions  (institutional  trust),  and are  more 
inclined  to  ‘civic  cooperation’  -  or at  least  to profess that  they do not condone ‘uncivil’ 
behaviour. Education is clearly not the only factor that predisposes people towards joining, 
engaging  and trusting,  but  it  is  a  powerful  predictor,  at  the  individual  level,  even when 
controlling for other variables such as wealth, income, age and gender. To Robert Putnam, 
current doyen of social capital theorists,  ‘Human and social capital are clearly related, for 
education has a very powerful effect on trust and associational membership, as well as many 
other forms of social and political participation.’ (Putnam, 1995, p.  667). 
Precisely how education contributes towards civic engagement and social capital, and under 
what conditions,  is not yet  well understood. We know rather little about the mechanisms 
through  which learning influences different kinds of individual social behaviour, the contexts 
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within  which  such  effects  occur,  and  how  and  why  they  change  over  time  in  different 
countries. Social capital theorists who have specifically addressed questions about learning, 
notably James Coleman, have mostly treated education as an outcome of social capital rather 
than as a cause. Those, like Putnam, who do take it as an independent variable have not 
generally  gone beyond describing statistical  associations  between levels  of education and 
social capital outcomes. Outside of the social capital  debate, there have been some social 
psychologists and political scientists (eg Emler and Frazer; 1999; Nie et al, 1996), who have 
sought to provide causal explanations as to how these effects occur.  However, their analyses 
remain largely at the level of the individual. 
What none of this work has begun to do is to provide the theoretical and empirical links 
between education and social cohesion at the macro societal level. In fact, arguably, none of 
the traditions above have a conceptual apparatus designed to address this question. Writings 
on education and civic participation see education as providing individual resources of skills 
and knowledge which can facilitate  certain  individual  social  behaviours,  but they tend to 
address  societal  effects  through  individual  aggregation  rather  than  analysis  of  societal 
institutions and cultures. Extrapolating from individual effects to societal effects may require 
more  than  simply  grossing-up of  individuals  outcomes,  since  individuals  effects  may  be 
relative  or  ‘positional’  as  Nie  suggests  with  his  theory  of  education  effects  on  political 
engagement through competition for limited network-central positions in society (Nie, 1996). 
1Social capital theory, despite using the language of individual resources and the deliberate 
analogy with human capital, claims to treat the ‘norms, networks and trust’ that constitute its 
central  concern as properties of social  relations as well as individual attributes (Coleman, 
1988).  But  the  theory  was  first  extensively  developed  by  Coleman  to  apply  to  local 
communities,  and has  arguably been subsequently most  successfully  applied  at  the level, 
rather than at the level of whole societies (Woolcock, 2000).  
The assumption common amongst social capital  theorists that countries with communities 
rich in social capital will also usually be more cohesive as societies is largely unexplored in 
the literature and highly debatable, since in reality this all depends on the norms and values of 
particular constituent communities and whether the different communities are at war or at 
1 Extrapolating from individual effects to societal effects may require more than simply grossing-up of 
individuals outcomes, since individual effects may be’relative’ or ‘positional’ as Nie suggests with his theory of 
education effects on political engagement through competition for limited network-central positions in society 
(Nie, 1996).  
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peace with one another other. Some countries cited in the research as having rich deposits of 
community social capital, such as contemporary Northern Ireland (Schuller, Baron and Field, 
2000) and the 1950s America (Putnam, 2000), would hardly be considered models of social 
cohesion on any of the traditional measures of the latter. 
Clearly, it does not automatically follow that because education raises levels of community 
participation amongst individuals, it will also increase societal cohesion. Nor does it follow 
that the mechanisms through which learning generates community participation and social 
capital are the same as those by which it may help to promote societal cohesion.  Yet these 
are rapidly becoming key assumptions of policy makers in America and the UK, who see 
lifelong  learning  as  promoting  social  cohesion  through  the  benefits  which  increased 
individual resources and competences bring to community renewal and social inclusion. 
Social capital theory has made rapid inroads into Anglo-American social science and policy 
making, largely displacing – or simply conflating – earlier, more ‘European’ discourses of 
social  cohesion  and social  solidarity.  However,  for  all  its  advances  in  the  understanding 
community networks, and despite the success of the theory in bringing the ‘social’ back into 
dominant neo-liberal discourses of politics and economics (Schuller, Baron and Field, 2000), 
there may also be dangers in forgetting the insights of some of the earlier traditions which 
treated cohesion as an explicitly societal phenomena. Social Capital and social cohesion are 
not necessarily the same thing.
 
In this article we seek to put the analysis of education and societal social cohesion back in the 
centre of the picture.  We do this firstly through a critical  review of some of the existing 
literature on education and social capital which points to the limitations of individual level 
analysis  of what  are fundamentally societal  issues. Secondly,  we outline some alternative 
models for understanding how education impacts on social cohesion in different societies, 
drawing  on an  analysis  of  some  of  the  aggregated  cross-national  data  on  skills,  income 
distribution and various indicators of social cohesion. The argument suggests some causal 
mechanisms for the social impacts of education which are quite different from those which 
normally underpin arguments about human and social capital.   
3
The Historical Origins of the Debate about Education and Social Cohesion
How education impacts - at the societal level - on social cohesion and social solidarity is 
hardly a new question. Historically, it has been a primary concern not only of various social 
movements and state policies, both of the Left and the Right, but also of mainstream social 
theory,  from  Emile  Durkheim  down  to  Robert  Merton  and  Talcott  Parsons.  Given  the 
historical amnesia of much contemporary social science, these antecedents are worth briefly 
recalling. 
As a theoretical and political concept, social cohesion has clearly taken diverse forms, from 
the  authoritarian  and  nationalistic  to  the  liberal,  communitarian  and  social  democratic 
versions that have tended to prevail in western states during the past half century. The role of 
education  in  promoting  social  cohesion  has  also  been construed  in  a  multitude  ways  by 
different historical groups, political ideologies, and state regimes. Crudely put, in nineteenth- 
century western Europe dominant social/political groups, whether of liberal or conservative 
orientations, tended to see education as a force for social order, whilst subordinate classes - 
and  more  particularly  radical  labour  movements  and  revolutionary  groups  -  tended  to 
celebrate its potential for collective improvement through forging class consciousness and 
political solidarity (Simon, 1981). In the twentieth century education has been mobilized in 
equally diverse ways in support of class or ethnic solidarism, nationalism, and democratic 
citizenship in its various forms.   
When mass public education first appeared in northern Europe and America during the era of 
state-building in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, it was seen primarily, at least 
by  the  dominant  social  groups,  as  a  means  of  building  integrated  national  polities  with 
cohesive  national  identities.  The national  education  system first  emerged  precisely  as  an 
instrument of state formation, providing an effective means for training state functionaries, 
promoting  loyalty  and social  order  amongst  the  masses,  disseminating  dominant  national 
ideologies and languages, and accustomizing populations to the new regulative regimes of the 
nascent modern bureaucracies (Boli, 1989; Green, 1990, 1997; Kaestle, 1983; Weber,1979). 
Later, say from the mid-nineteenth century, education become important for providing the 
skills  and  knowledge  needed  for  the  ‘second’,  science-based,  industrial  revolution 
(Hobsbawm,  1967)  and  the  civic  attitudes  deemed  essential  for  maintaining  stability  as 
franchises and democratic rights were extended. As social historians, Ramirez and Boli, write 
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(1987),  ‘European  states  became  engaged  in  authorizing,  funding  and  managing  mass 
schooling as part of an endeavour to construct a unified national polity’. 
Contemporary advocates of mass education, from the ‘old world’ of aristocratic Europe to the 
‘new world’ of America, almost invariably justified the massive and unprecedented exercise 
of  state  intervention  as  a  necessary  and  critical  part  of  nation-building.  Noah  Webster, 
Federalist educational campaigner and author of numerous popular dictionaries and spelling 
books in the American Early Republic, argued that education was a necessity for developing 
the American ‘national character’ which, in a land of immigrants and new institutions, was 
‘not yet formed’; Andrew Lunt, a vocal Democrat supporter of public education in the later 
Jacksonian period, proclaimed that education was the 'very bulwark of the republic' and the 
'pillars' on which American democracy was supported (Kaestle, 1983). Northern continental 
Europe was equally, though often initially less democratically, concerned with education as 
nation-building.  Baron  Dubin,  writing  in  Prussia  in  1826,  claimed  that:  ‘Practically  all 
modern  nations  are  now  awake  to  the  fact  that  education  is  the  most  potent  means  of 
development of the essentials of nationality.’ (quoted in Fuller and Robinson, 1992, p.52)
From a later and more democratic vantage point, and less specifically concerned with issues 
of  national  identity,  Emile  Durkheim  provided  the  first  systematic  theorization  of  the 
historical role and social function of mass education precisely in terms of social integration: 
‘Society,’ he wrote, ‘can only exist if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of 
homogeneity. Education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, 
from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands.’ (Durkheim, 1977) 
Durkheim wrote as a liberal  socialist  republican in late nineteenth century France (Lukes, 
1973),  but  his  theories  left  a  complex  legacy informing  both  Left  and  Right  notions  of 
education  and  social  order.  Social  democratic  traditions  in  continental  Europe  continued 
through  next  century  to  stress  the  importance  of  schooling  for  social  solidarity  and 
democratic  citizenship,  most  notably  in  the  Nordic  countries  (Boucher,  1982).  Various 
strands in twentieth-century Conservative thought, and particularly the tradition of ‘romantic’ 
Conservatism which  Raymond  Williams  traced from Burke and Coleridge  down through 
Ruskin,  T.H.  Green  and  Michael  Oakshot  (Williams,  1958),  have  also  emphasised  the 
importance of education to social cohesion, in this case with the emphasis on maintaining the 
‘organic community’ with its stable social hierarchies and more narrowly conceived notions 
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of national values. The educational campaigner and philosopher of aesthetics, Roger Scruton, 
most notably adopted this position in his diatribes against multicultural education at the time 
of the 1988 Education Reform Act in the UK (Hillgate Group, 1987). At least one major 
strand  in  twentieth-century  western  sociology  -  tradition  of  Parsonian  functionalism  - 
continued to focus on education and the transmission of the normative values.  
In the post second world war period,  newly independent states,  particularly those in East 
Asia, continued to regard education as an important vehicle of nation building (Inkeles and 
Sirowy,  1983; Green,  1999; Gopinathan,  1994; Hill  and Fee,  1995).  However,  generally-
speaking,  in  the  advanced western  states,  this  aspect  of  schooling  became gradually less 
emphasised. This was partly,  at first, because of the sharpened post-war awareness of the 
dangers of nationalist appropriations of education, and then later because of the difficulty of 
finding adequate ways of conceptualizing national identity in the more culturally pluralist 
societies of the global age (Castells, 1997; Hildebrand and Sting, 1995). At the same time,  
education  became  increasingly  associated  with  the  goals  economic  development.  Skills 
formation  came  rapidly  to  overshadow  citizen  formation  as  the  primary  goal  of  public 
education in most developed states (Green, 1997). The rise of human capital theory in the 
1960s provided academic justification for the more economically instrumentalist  views of 
education  which  were  had  already  gained  prominence  amongst  western  policy-makers, 
particularly in English-speaking countries.  Even as the discourse of lifelong learning became 
ubiquitous in the 1990s, its main rationale remained, at least in the more neo-liberal states, 
the goal of economic competitiveness (Coffield, 2000). 
The tide now appears to be turning, to a degree at least. The European Commission, with its 
model of ‘social Europe’ and a raison d’etre of integration, has always maintained a concern 
with social solidarity and the ways in which this may be promoted by education. The recent 
Lifelong Learning Memorandum (EC, 2001) arguably pushes this further into centre stage. 
Various countries have been reviewing their citizenship education policies (Australia, France, 
the UK, and - more or less continually in the East Asian states)  (Osler and Starkey, 2000). 
The New Labour Government in the UK has also shown an increasing preoccupation with 
problems of social exclusion and concomitantly with the social - or wider, non-economic - 
benefits  of learning (Bynner,  2001; Green and Preston, 2001). These policy shifts can no 
doubt be traced to growing concerns, throughout the advanced economies, about the socially 
fragmentary effects of globalization, and the symptoms of community breakdown and social 
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disorder  that  seem to  accompany  rising  consumerism and  individualization  (Beck,  2000; 
Green, 1997).  
Education and social integration has thus re-emerged on the policy agenda. However, this 
time in new clothes. The dominant policy discourse, at least in the Anglo-Saxon countries, is 
no longer about social cohesion and social solidarity, and the impacts of education on these, 
but rather on community renewal and impact of education on ‘social inclusion’ via the labour 
market.  The  dominant  theoretical  discourse  has  changed  as  well.  Theories  of  social 
integration have been superseded in current theory by the burgeoning new discourse of social 
capital. In both cases - in terms of policy and theory - there has been a significant shift from 
the macro societal perspective on social cohesion (whether of the Left or Right) to the more 
micro -   individual  or and community level  -  analysis.  The role  of education in shaping 
‘social’  outcomes is re-established,  but the social  is  now conceived in a different - more 
individualized - way.
The Rise of Social Capital Theory
Social  capital  theory  is  heir  to  a  long  American  tradition  of  liberal,  democratic  localist 
thinking which dates back at least to de Tocqueville’s 1836 essay on Democracy in America 
(de Tocqueville, 1956; Foley and Edwards, 1998; Showronek; 1982; Skocpol, 1996). This 
remarkable  text,  for  all  its  deafening  silences  on  class  and  racial  divisions,  provided  an 
extraordinarily  perceptive  commentary  on  social  customs  and  civic  society  in  the  New 
World,  celebrating  the vibrant  associational  life  of the Jacksonian North as a  democratic 
alternative the étatism of contemporary continental Europe. It left behind a potent legacy of 
anti-state  civic  ideology in  American  political  culture  that  is  now being  re-appropriated, 
ironically - and significantly - at precisely the point when many fear that associational life 
there is in serious decline. Its return has been by a circuitous route.
The notion of social capital was first extensively elaborated in Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical 
work  (Bourdieu  and  Passeron,  1970;  Bourdieu,  1980),  as  one  of  a  cluster  of  concepts, 
including  human  capital  and  cultural  capital,  which  sought  to  disentangle  the  various 
resources and processes which underpin the acquisition and transmission of power and status 
in modern capitalist societies. Bourdieu’s subtle formulations, though at times conceptually 
blurred and fuzzy, were carefully contextualised both socially and historically. However, they 
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have been all but forgotten in recent developments of the field within Anglo-Saxon economic 
and sociological thought, where the dominant approach has been the more decontextualized 
universalism of methodological individualism. Two strands have been most prevalent in the 
rise of the social capital research industry.   
The  first  is  the  tradition  inaugurated  by  James  Coleman  in  his  influential  1988  essay 
(Coleman, 1988)  ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’ which sought to illustrate 
how  customary  and  apparently  non-rational  social  behaviours  could  be  understood  as 
attempts to overcome economic externalities and market failures. Drawing on his previous 
work on social exchange theory,  and working alongside Gary Becker at the University of 
Chicago (while the latter was simultaneously applying human capital logic to new areas of 
non-market  behaviour),  Coleman sought  to  extend rational  choice  theory further  into  the 
social  domain  by analysing  the  role  that  trust  and  social  reciprocity  played  in  resolving 
problems of collective action. Coleman was careful to limit his analysis to specific, bounded, 
local communities rather than to whole societies, arguing that social capital was primarily a 
‘public good’ and a relational property of people in particular communities,  rather than a 
portable or ‘fungible’ individual asset (Brown and Lauder, 2000). 
Following Coleman, economists took up the idea and applied it to a growing range of social 
contexts and issues, from the micro to the macro levels (albeit in the latter case still using an 
essentially individual level approach). In one account at least (Fine, 2001; Fine and Green, 
2000), this development can be seen as part of the evolution of the economics profession as it 
seeks to overcome the acknowledged limitations of its own traditional paradigm based on 
rational agents, utility maximization and equilibriating markets, largely divorced from their 
historical, cultural and institutional contexts. The latest wave of new neo-classical economics, 
and particularly the ‘information-theoretical’ approach associated with Joe Stiglitz’s former 
work at the World Bank, attempts to overcome some of these limitations by understanding 
non-market conforming behaviours in terms of rational responses to information asymmetries 
and deficits. A number of economists and sociologists at the World Bank have subsequently 
begun to use the notion of social capital in analyses of anything from housing markets to 
crime,  health  and  growth  rates.  Their  work  is  disseminated  to  the  outside  academic 
community via a popular website ( which is dedicated to social capital debate. 
Social capital has thus come to be seen by these economists (and the sociologists working 
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with them) as an immensely flexible conceptual tool which can be used explain a wide array 
of social phenomena - previously ignored or assumed away by economists - in a way which 
can be made consistent with market economic logic. In the process, and by virtue of a single 
concept,  whole  tracts  of  the  social  geography  have  been  re-appropriated  for  economics 
without reference to any of the theoretical maps developed by generations of sociologists. 
Michael Woolcock, who manages the social capital website at the World Bank, notes the 
positive and negative sides of this: ‘several critics,’ he writes,  ‘not without justification, have 
voiced their  concern that collapsing an entire discipline [sociology]  into a single variable 
[social  capital]...is  a  travesty,  but  there  are  others  that  are  pleased  that  mainstream 
sociological ideas are finally being given their due at the highest levels’ (Fine, 2001, p.167). 
The second strand of recent social capital theory is primarily associated with the work of the 
political scientist, Robert Putnam, who moved from his early work on civic association and 
local Government in Italy (Putnam, 1993) - where social capital appears as an essentially 
post-hoc theory in the coda to the book -  to a full scale study of the trends in social capital in  
the USA (Putnam, 2000). Putnam’s work has been immensely influential, partly because of 
his exhaustive compilation of data on various social capital measures and partly because his 
liberal  communitarian message about the power of civic association is highly palatable to 
market oriented governments and commentators seeking politically acceptable solutions to 
global problems of social fragmentation.  His analysis and policy message are both, however, 
based on a paradox. 
In  Making  Democracy  Work (1993),  he  argued  that  the  superior  performance  of  local 
government in the northern regions of Italy was due to the higher reserves of social capital 
accumulated  there  over  thousands  of  years.  These  were  seen,  following  Coleman,  as 
essentially  the  bi-product  of  other  historical  developments  and  cultural  movements.  In 
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000), his recent study of 
social capital in the USA, he seeks to show both that social capital suffered a precipitous 
decline in a mere thirty years after the late 1960s, and that it is ripe for renewal. 
The  contention  that  social  capital  accumulates  historically  at  snail’s  pace  but  can  be 
dissipated very rapidly is  somewhat  curious  from an historical  point of view,  and would 
certainly have surprised Putnam’s mentor, de Tocqueville, whose greatest work, The Ancien  
Regime and the French Revolution (1955), was devoted to showing how even revolution 
9
failed to expunge the legacies of the Ancien Regime in France, in fact building on centralised 
statism that was its hallmark.  As historians frequently remind us, whilst institutions can be 
suddenly and radically  transformed,  at  least  on the surface,  cultures  change very slowly. 
Equally contradictory is Putnam’s optimism about the possibilities of a socially willed reprise 
of social capital in America, given the earlier adherence to Coleman’s notion of social capital 
accumulating  almost  involuntarily  as  a  bi-product  of  other  processes.  The  antinomies  of 
Putnam’s  title  and  theme  about  collapse  and  revival  appear  both  naïve  and  politically 
expedient  in  the final  essay on the possibilities  of communitarian revival.  Cassandra and 
Pangloss both, Putnam can apparently appeal to a wide policy audience, but he has found 
more critics amongst his academic readers.
Putnam’s Paradoxes 
Putnam defines social capital as the ‘features of social life - networks, norms and trust - that 
enable participants  to act  together  more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam, 
1995). These objectives are not always laudable, and Putnam has increasingly acknowledged 
the ‘dark side’ of social capital (Schuller, Baron and Field, 2000), but for the most part he 
still treats the concept normatively as a positive basis for enlightened community and active 
democracy.  In the positive civil  society scenario,  a number of characteristic attitudes and 
behaviours,  including  association,  volunteering,  donation,  political  engagement,  trust  and 
tolerance,  are  seen  to  work  together  in  a  virtuous  spiral  to  produce  desirable  collective 
outcomes. ‘Other things being equal,’ Putnam writes (2000, p. 137) ‘people who trust their 
fellow citizens  volunteer  more  often,  contribute  more  readily to  charity,  participate  more 
often in politics and community organizations, serve more readily in juries, give blood more 
frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, 
and display many other forms of civic virtue.’ How these behaviours are connected is not 
always clear, and Putnam acknowledges that causality for individuals can run in different 
directions, but his claim is that the evidence (which he doesn’t cite) weighs on the side of 
joining forming the basis for trust, rather than the reverse. For Putnam, as for de Tocqueville, 
what counts most is the vibrancy of associational life - ‘the social networks’ from which arise 
‘the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness’  (Putnam, 2000).
Education has a powerful effect on social capital, being the strongest predictor of individual 
associational membership, trust and political participation (Putnam, 2000, p.667). According 
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to Putnam, the US data show that the last two years of college attendance make twice as 
much  difference  to  trust  and  group  membership  as  the  first  two  years  of  high  school, 
irrespective of gender, race and generation. Highly educated people, says Putnam, ‘are much 
more likely to be joiners and trusters, partly because they are better off economically,  but 
mostly because of the skills, resources, and inclinations that were imparted to them at home 
and in school’ (Putnam, 2000, p.667).  
Despite rising levels of education, however, social capital in America is in decline, according 
to Putnam’s analysis in  Bowling Alone. On all his measures of membership, trust, political 
engagement and voting, there has been a steady erosion since the late 1960s which applies 
across genders, ethnic and social groups and educational levels. These declines, according to 
Putnam, cannot be explained by urbanization, mobility, time pressures or the changing roles 
of  women.  They  are  primarily  generational  effects  reflecting  the  passing  of  the  socially 
engaged New Deal generation and its replacement by generations of so-called ‘boomers’ and 
‘Xers’ who have more privatised lifestyles and spend more time watching TV. America, the 
quintessential land of association has, in the course of two generations, become disassociated. 
At the level of the individual, Putnam’s analysis of social capital has much to commend it. He 
has compiled a huge mass of data based on a wide array of indicators which shows, fairly 
conclusively, at least for contemporary America, that there is a relation between individuals 
trusting, joining and becoming politically engaged, and that education relates to all of these, 
either directly or indirectly. He has also charted the trends over a substantial period, showing 
that the behaviour of the American public is indeed changing in significant ways. Several 
critics have contested his analysis  of declining levels of association,  but if you accept his 
(largely fixed) choice of indicators, the evidence is clear and comprehensive. However, for all 
this, and despite his claims to be providing an account social change in America, he has said 
very little about American society as such, how it hangs together or fails to hang together, 
and how education impacts on social cohesion at this societal level. A number of obvious 
problems  stand  out  and  illustrate  the  weakness  of  Putnam’s  approach  in  providing 
explanations at the societal level using tools more appropriate for the analysis of individual 
and community behaviour. 
Firstly,  if  association is the key to social  capital  -  and by extension social  cohesion - as 
Putnam maintains,  why is it  that the USA, which ranks highest on levels of membership 
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amongst a wide range of countries in repeated World Values Surveys (Inglehart, 1990), is so 
palpably lacking in social cohesion on any of the more conventional measures like crime and 
inter-ethnic conflict?  Second, why, if education is such a strong determinant of individual 
joining and trusting, is social capital declining so fast in America when education levels are 
still  rising,  and most  with the younger  generations who are precisely the most  educated? 
Thirdly, if the decline is due to factors other than education, which on Putnam’s account it 
must be, how do these impinge at societal and individual levels?  Putnam finds it difficult to 
answer these kinds of questions with conviction because his argument, which is pitched at the 
level of individual behaviour, lacks the cultural, institutional and political dimensions that are 
critical to understanding societal change. 
Putnam argues that associational membership is the key to social capital and social cohesion. 
But what evidence do we have for this? We know that in contemporary America individuals 
who join more also tend to trust more and to be more politically engaged than those who do 
not. We also know that in various other contemporary societies the correlation holds at the 
individual level (Brehm and Rahm, 1997; Hall, 1999; Stolle and Rochen, 1998). However, if 
you extend the analysis to a larger set of countries, as Newton and Norris (2000) have done 
using pooled data 17 countries in the World Values Survey, the association at the individual 
level becomes extremely weak, and no correlation at all can be found at the societal level (see 
also  Knack  and  Keefe,  1997;  Norris,  2001).  America  has  exceptionally  high  level  of 
membership  relative  to  other  countries  but  exceptionally  low  levels  of  voting  and  only 
moderate levels of trust (Inglehart, 1990).  
Putnam’s  contention,  which  is  at  the  heart  of  social  capital  theory,  that  these  various 
characteristics  ‘form a  coherent  syndrome’  (2000;  p.137)  may  apply  at  the  level  of  the 
individual in some countries but the proposition does not hold for all. As Stolle and Rochen 
(1999) show in relation to Sweden, Germany and the USA, context, including the role of the 
state,  may have an important bearing on how these characteristics interact.  Consequently, 
there may also be no relation at all between joining and trusting at the societal level. It may 
be the case that individuals who join more also trust and engage more politically in some 
contexts,  but there may be independent  factors that determine the levels of each of these 
separately  at  the  societal  level  which  are  far  more  powerful  than  the  associations  at  the 
individual  level.  This  may mean  that  some  countries  have  both  high  levels  of  trust  and 
moderate  levels of joining relative to other countries, as seems to be the case for instance in 
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some Nordic states, whilst others, like the USA, have relatively high levels of joining and 
lower levels of trust (Inglehart, 1990). If these core social capital characteristics do not co-
vary across countries it suggests that they have little meaning as a single factor at the societal 
level. 
The primacy accorded to association in Putnam’s account of social capital is contentious in 
other ways. His main concern is how much people associate and join, and his analysis of this 
is largely quantitative.  However, quantitative approaches may well miss the key issue for 
social cohesion.  What do people join for and how does it enhance social integration? Putnam 
acknowledges  that  there  are  different  kinds  of  association  and  that  those  that  encourage 
‘bridging’ between groups and associations and with individual outsiders are more important 
to social capital than those which merely encourage in-group bonding. This is an important 
point.  As  Mark  Granovetter  has  shown (1978),  weak  but  extensive  ties  may  have  more 
beneficial social effects than the strong ties of dense but relatively closed networks. Societies 
with  excessively  close  and  closed  family  ties,  may  tend  towards  the  ‘amoral  familism’ 
described by Banfield (1970) which may be neither trusting nor innovative in societal terms. 
Equally, as Mancur Olson famously argued (1971) for some of the victorious allied powers 
after  WW2  by  contrast  with  their  defeated  but  reconstructed  rivals,  states  with  long 
established and powerful interest groups – and thus high levels of association - may become 
prone to sclerosis and slow growth. 
The importance of these qualitative distinctions in forms of association are acknowledged by 
Putnam in principle.  However, in his own analysis he is unable to distinguish effectively 
between organizations which involve bridging and those which involve bonding, so that his 
conclusions regarding overall trends in association are based on gross aggregates more than 
any qualitative analysis of the way people associate. This proves to be a fatal weakness in his  
account and renders his analysis superficial as a commentary on social cohesion. 
In terms of institutional and societal behaviour, there is no necessary relationship between 
associational membership and social trust. It depends entirely on the types of organizations 
involved  and  their  objectives.  Active  and  long-term  membership  of  some  types  of 
organization may incubate trust through reiterated social interactions as predicted in game 
theory (Fukuyama, 1999; Granovetter, 1973; Axelrod, 1986); this may be a generalized trust 
if the organizations are relatively ‘encompassing’ and heterogeneous, and if they are pursuing 
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collective  public  goals  which  go beyond the  narrow interests  of  small  groups of  people. 
Under certain historical circumstances major political parties or coalitions of parties might fit 
this description, constructing what one tradition describes as national popular ideologies or 
hegemonic social relations (Gramsci, 1971). Trade unions may also at times play this role, 
especially  where  they  are  large  general  or  industrial  unions  representing  disparate 
occupations  at  different  levels,  as  opposed  to  craft  unions  and  professional  associations 
representing  narrower interests.  Likeswise,  major  Churches  and religions,  where they are 
broadly ecumenical  (members of evangelist churches in the USA trust less than the average, 
whereas members of the broad mainstream Churches trust more - see Putman, 2000). 
On the other hand, membership of exclusivist organizations with self-interested goals may 
encourage trust amongst their members but positively erode trust in society at large (Newton, 
1999).  Extremist  or  racist  organizations,  for  instance,  may  well  produce  high  levels  of 
internal bonding but be guaranteed, at the same time, to generate distrust from their members 
to people outside and towards their members from people outside.  Timothy McVeigh and his 
co-conspirators  in  the  Oklahoma  bombing  were  all  members  of  bowling  clubs,  which 
provides a salutary and somewhat ironic commentary on Putnam’s thesis (Fine, 2001). 
The crux of the matter in terms of social  cohesion is whether associations foster in their 
members trust in the generality of people rather than simply in other members, and whether 
this increment to the pool of public trust is not counterbalanced by any diminution in trust 
amongst those outside generated by the existence of the same organization. Putnam’s analysis 
is simply unable to evaluate this, which weakens his argument about the overall trends in 
American society. His case is that the gross levels of membership in the US are declining and 
that  this  must  be bad for trust  and ultimately for democracy.  Others have argued just  as 
plausibly that levels of association are actually quite stable in the USA, but that people are 
joining different types of organization whose membership levels Putnam does not measure, 
and which may be less conducive to social cohesion (Fukuyama, 2000). On Putnam’s own 
evidence  (and that  of  Warde  et  al  for  the UK: 2001),  the  types  of  membership  that  are 
declining  fastest  are  precisely  those  involving  the  large,  encompassing,  multi-interest 
associations, such as the party and union. Membership growth tends to be in single-function 
or single-issue organizations, like sports clubs and self-help and environmental groups, or 
within  lobby-type  organizations,  which,  by definition,  are  serving narrow interests.  What 
matters for social cohesion is the type and aims of association rather than the quantity. 
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In a recent study of social cohesion and fragmentation in modern societies (Fukuyama, 2000) 
Francis  Fukuyama  considers  the  changing  nature  of  associational  life  and  the  apparent 
paradox, in America, of the coexistence of relatively high levels of association and growing 
levels  of  distrust  and  social  fragmentation.  The  answer,  he  says,  ‘has  to  do  with  moral 
miniaturization: while people continue to participate in group life, the groups themselves are 
less authoritative and produce a smaller radius of trust.  As a whole, then, there are fewer 
common values shared by societies and more competition amongst groups.’ (p. 49) Whether 
or  not  one  shares  Fukuyama’s  socially  conservative  analysis  of  the  causes  of  societal 
fragmentation, he has certainly pointed to a dilemma at the heart of social capital theory and 
one which underlines the importance of societal explanations of social cohesion.
Putnam’s analysis  remains ultimately at  the level of the quantifying individual behaviour. 
From his perspective he is unable to provide meaningful measures of cohesion in society at 
large, let alone to provide meaningful explanations of changes over time. Where there should 
be analysis of cultural and ideological shifts, of changes in economic and social structures, 
and of new institutional arrangements, there are simply extrapolations made from individual 
associations. True to his liberal, individualist tradition, he overlooks the importance of role of 
the state and institutions in providing the structural basis for social cohesion (Skocpol, 1996), 
remaining  largely  silent  on  the  effects  on  social  relations  of  two  decades  neo-liberal 
government, with rising consumerism and individualism and the gradual dismantling of the 
welfare  apparatus.  Despite  his  own  empirical  demonstrations  of  the  clear  cross-regional 
correlations between social capital and income equality, he fails to explore the connections in 
America  between  declining  social  capital  and  rising  inequality  and  social  conflict.   In 
Putnam’s  hands,  social  capital  provides  a  distinctly  romantic  view of  society  devoid  of 
power, politics and conflict (Edward and Foley, 1998; Skocpol, 1996).   
What both strands of social capital thinking have in common, and the reason why they can 
relate  so  readily  to  mainstream  paradigms  in  neo-classical  economics,  is  that,  despite 
ostensibly  dealing  with  questions  of  collective  action  and  community,  they  are  equally 
wedded to a liberal, individualist view of society. Social capital economists ultimately still 
adhere to a methodological individualism that seeks to explain all social phenomena in terms 
of individual preferences, rational calculation and utility functions, assuming universal - and 
hence a-social and a-historical - principles of utilitarian human behaviour. As Fine and Green 
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note (2000), history only enters into mainstream economics as ‘path dependence’, ‘random 
shocks’ and ‘unexplained initial conditions,’ while society is absorbed as exogenous givens 
limiting but not constituting elected individual preferences. Putnam and his followers, whilst 
making  passing  reference  to  culture  and  institutions,  also  fundamentally  locate  and 
operationalize their analyses at the level of individual behaviour, despite acknowledging the 
relational nature of social capital. Neither is able to address the broader questions of social 
cohesion and the effects of education on it.
A Societal Approach to Social Cohesion
An alternative approach to social  cohesion is to view it  from a societal  perspective.  This 
assumes that cohesion in society at large involves not only bonding and trust within particular 
groups and communities but also between them; and that this entails some common sense of 
citizenship and values.  Inevitably,  therefore,  it  is  concerned with questions  of power and 
resource  distribution,  conflict  and  conflict  resolution  and  the  state  forms,  institutions, 
ideologies and cultures that shape these in any given country.  Although regional differences 
within countries will be important, many of factors that most determine societal cohesion in a 
given country will be structural and national in nature and will require analysis at the societal 
level. These are often best analysed through comparative qualitative methods (Ragin, 1981) 
which give purchase on the effects  of different  national  level  factors.  Where quantitative 
approaches  are  used,  they  will  generally  involve  cross-national  comparisons  that  use 
countries as the units of analysis  because many of the national  contextual  or ‘ecological’ 
factors will be invisible to individual level.
  
Econometricians are often sceptical of cross-national statistical analysis. The limitations of 
datasets  often  mean  that  there  are  too  few  units  of  analysis  (countries)  to  run  reliable 
statistical regressions (Ragin, 1981). Also, cross-national correlations will sometimes produce 
results which conflict with the results of individual level statistical analysis and which will be 
dismissed  as  ‘ecological  fallacies’  (Wilkinson,  1996).  To  methodological  individualism, 
phenomena  which  can’t  be  explained  statistically  as  the  result  of  the  accumulation  of 
individual  actions  do not  exist.  However,  this  simply ignores  the fact  that  many societal 
phenomena are indefinable and hence unmeasurable at that level - as is notably the case with 
income inequality.  Alternatively,  they remain unobserved because they exist as constants. 
What this means, essentially, is that these contextual factors cannot be used statistically to 
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explain  variations  between  individuals  and  therefore  cannot  be  entered  into  the  models. 
However, this should not necessarily imply that they are not major determinants of individual 
behaviour, nor that they are not highly significant in providing the contexts in which other 
variables, which can be observed, work.  Statistical analysis may be satisfied when it can use 
individual level variables to understand ten per cent of the variance in individual behaviour in 
a  given  national  population.   However,  much  larger  variations  in  behaviour  between 
individuals in populations across different countries may remain quite inexplicable.
A cross-national societal approach to social cohesion is likely to differ from an individual- 
level human capital or rational choice perspective in other important ways. It will start from 
the assumption that all relations are context bound, that is to say specific to historical times 
and places and the structures and environments that pertain to them (Foley and Edwards, 
1998). In terms of the social effects of education this would imply an a priori scepticism 
towards any propositions about universal relationships based on time and place specific data, 
such as the often cited association, for instance, between education and tolerance. From a 
comparative and historical point of view such ideas are very easily refuted. It would also 
imply taking institutional and cultural factors seriously.  Modern economics, at least in the 
form  of  the  new  institutional  economics,  has  begun  to  take  institutional  structures  into 
account  as,  of  course,  classical  political  economy  always  did  before  the  marginalist 
movement  narrowed  economists’  concerns.  However,  cultural  factors  are  still  massively 
underestimated in modern economics and rational choice sociology, appearing, if at all, only 
as individual  preference,  which,  of course,  is  precisely what  culture is  not.  Lifestyle  and 
culture are not synonymous.
Comparative,  cross-national  analysis,  on the other hand, is almost  bound to attend to the 
importance of cultures since there is overwhelming evidence that countries do in fact differ 
substantially, regularly and enduringly on a whole variety of cultural measures, not least to 
our  concerns,  in  terms  of aggregate levels  of trust,  association,  political  engagement  and 
tolerance.  As Ronald Inglehart tersely concludes from his exhaustive study of data for 25 
countries  in  the  World  Values  Survey  (1990)  ‘The  peoples  of  different  societies  are 
characterized by enduring differences in basic attitudes, values and skills: In other words they 
have different  cultures.’  (1990,  p.3)  These cultures  are  not  monolithic  and nor  are  they 
immutable. However, in given times and places they act as important determinants of social 
and political behaviour which cannot be left out of account. 
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To  provide  an  obvious  example:  more  educated  people  in  most  contemporary  western 
societies tend to be more tolerant, other things being equal, than less educated people, as 
countless research studies have shown (see Nie et al, 1996).  However, this does not mean 
more educated societies, past or present, are always more tolerant, nor, even, that educated 
people are more tolerant in all societies. Nazism arose in Weimar Germany, one of the most 
highly educated countries on earth at the time. This may mean that education did not have 
any positive effects  on tolerance in Germany then. German Protestants, after  all,  were on 
average more educated than Catholics but they were also more likely to vote for the National 
Socialists, who received support from all social classes. Alternatively, it may simply mean 
that any positive education effects were overshadowed by other factors.  The analysis of data 
on education and social attitudes across a range of countries in the World Values Survey 
shows only very weak correlations between average national levels of education and social 
capital,  suggesting  that  the  associations  demonstrated  at  the  individual  level  in  various 
countries are outweighed in cross-country comparisons by other national factors, as we show 
below.
Education and Social Cohesion: A Cross-National Societal Perspective
In  what  follows  we  use  a  comparative,  cross-national  approach  to  develop  and  perform 
preliminary tests on an alternative model for the effects of education on social cohesion at the 
societal level. This serves primarily illustrative and exploratory purposes at this stage. We do 
not  progress  to  the  point  of  providing any institutional  and cultural  explanations  for  the 
posited relations, but the hypotheses are based on the forgoing theoretical analysis and are 
constructed  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  amenable  to  this  kind  of  qualitative  causal 
explanation. 
We start by identifying a set of variables that co-vary at the national level and which analysis 
of  the  literature  suggests  may  form  a  valid  combined  indicator  of  national  level  social 
cohesion. We then propose and test a model for the effects of education on social cohesion at 
the national  level,  using aggregated data  for a sample  of countries  from various  existing 
cross-sectional datasets.2  In order to explore most fully our hypothesis we use two data sets. 
2National values for distributions of educational outcomes are calculated from the International Adult Literacy 
Survey data since these provide direct measures of skills which are deemed better indicators of education that 
the years of schooling measures commonly used by human capital theorists.  Social attitude measures for a 
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The ‘main’  dataset is  a cross sectional  set of 15 economically advanced democracies  for 
which we have data on social cohesion aggregates, skills and income distributions.  Except 
where indicated otherwise in the text, our analysis refers to this dataset.  However, in order to 
explore  further  the  robustness  of  hypothesis  related  to  social  cohesion  measures  we use 
additionally an expanded dataset  of 38 developed and developing countries that could be 
categorised as “market economies”.  The data on these countries is rather more limited – we 
have  information  on two social  cohesion  measures  (trust  and civic  participation)  and on 
income distribution.  In the final section we discuss the efficacy of this model and its relation 
to other models.
Our model hypothesises that education affects national levels of cohesion not only through 
socialization but also through the indirect effects that the distribution of educational outcomes 
has  through income distribution.  Put  simply,  countries  with education  systems producing 
more  equal  outcomes  in  terms  of  skills  and qualifications  are  likely to  have  more  equal 
distribution of income and this in turn promotes social cohesion. The model is theoretically 
plausible  because  there  is  already  considerable  evidence  (Nickell  and  Layard,  1998; 
OEACD/Statistics Canada, 2000) for a range of developed countries that skills distribution 
and  income  distribution  correlate  highly  at  the  national  level,  and  that  cross-nationally 
income distribution is powerful predictor of social outcomes such as crime (McMahon, 1999) 
and health (Wilkinson, 1996).
Figure One
sample of countries are taken from the World Values Surveys of 1990 and 1995 and from national crime 
statistics (from Interpol). Gini coefficients for income inequality in different countries come from World Bank 
Statistics. Appendix 1 explains how our figures were derived for the main and expanded datasets.
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Measuring Social Cohesion
Our analysis starts from proposition that social cohesion can only be measured at the societal 
level with indicators which are appropriate to that level and with sets of indicators which do 
actually  co-vary and cluster  at  the national  level.  Social  capital  theory uses  measures  of 
association, trust, civic co-operation and political engagement to represent social capital at 
the individual/community level. However, as the discussion above suggested, these do not 
form a coherent  syndrome at  the national  level.  Some countries  with comparatively high 
levels of association have moderate to low levels of trust (USA) and others with lower levels 
of association (Denmark and other Nordics) have high levels of trust (see Inglehart, 1990). 
Furthermore, on the basis of analysis of trends, there are some countries (USA) where trust 
and association appear to be declining in tandem (if you follow Putnam at least) and others 
where they are moving in different directions (ie UK - see Hall, 1999).  Analysis by Knack 
and  Keefer  (1997)  of  data  on  29  market  countries  in  the  World  Values  Survey (WVS) 
showed that there was no correlation between aggregate levels of trust and  association across 
countries  after  controlling  for  education  and income.   Other  studies  have  confirmed  this 
(Norris, 2001; Newton and Norris, 2000).
Our own analysis of a slightly different sample of fifteen developed countries in the WVS 
(without controls) confirms that there is no correlation across countries between three of the 
social capital measures.  These measures, the countries used and data sources are described in 
appendix  1.  We  use  measures  for  general  trust  and  trust  in  democracy  (GENTR  and 
DEMTR),  for  civic  co-operation  in  terms  of  attitudes  to  cheating  on  taxes  and  public 
transport  (TAXCH  and  TRANCH),  a  civic  participation  measure  (GROUP),  a  tolerance 
indicator (TOLER) and measures of violent crime and a perception of risk of assult in the 
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local community safety (CRIME and RISK).  Note that these crime and community safety 
variables  are  coded so that  a  reduction  in  crime or risk would be thought  to  be socially 
beneficial. 
 As  Figure  2  (below)  shows3 there  is  no  significant  relationship4 between  general  trust 
(GENTR),  associational  memberships  (GROUP)  and  opposition  to  cheating  on  public 
transport  fares  (TRANSCHE)  at  an  aggregate  level.  Figure  3  shows  in  the  form  of  a 
scatterplot the lack of clear relationship between group memberships (GROUP) and general 
trust  (GENTR)  at  the  national  level  –  elements  which  are  often  taken  to  be  centrally 
“coherent  syndromes”  of  social  capital.   This  lack  of  a  relationship  between  civic 
participation  and  general  trust  was  also  found  in  our  expanded  dataset  of  38  market 
economies.  As shown in figure 4, a scatterplot indicates little correlation between general 
trust and civic participation as confirmed by statistical tests (r=-.069, p=.628).
However, as figure 2 shows, there are significant correlations between general trust (GENTR) 
and trust in government (DEMTR)5 in the main dataset (r=.563, p=.029).  There are also a 
strongly significant relationships between general trust and a feeling of local safety (RISK) 
(r=-.724, p=.005) (p<0.001) and between norms of civic co-operation such as never cheating 
on  taxes  (TAXCH) and never  cheating  on  public  transport  (TRANCH) (r=.592,  p=.020) 
(p<0.001). These do not significantly correlate in our analysis with trust and membership, but 
in Knack and Keefer’s (1997) analysis  of the same data, which uses an aggregated factor 
based on answers to a larger number of questions about honesty and civic co-operation, there 
is  a  correlation  between  trust  and  civic  co-operation  values.  Civic  co-operation  might 
therefore be included as a co-variant of trust, although we have not done so in this analysis.  
Figure 2 also reveals a significant negative correlation between tolerance (TOLER) and never 
cheating  on  public  transport  (TRANCH)  which  might  indicate  that  there  is  a  perverse 
relationship  between  these  liberal  attitudes  at  a  national  level  (r=-.526,  p=.044).   Those 
countries  with  a  higher  proportion  of  the  population  trusting  people  in  general  are  also 
significantly more likely to have a high proportion of the population who are prepared to 
3 Estimates were computed using the SPSS computer package 
4 The test for significance is p<0.05 for a two-tailed test 
5 This conflicts with Knack and Keefer’s  (1997) findings from WVS that aggregate national levels of civic 
cooperation co-vary with social trust scores.
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cheat with their public transport fares. Interestingly, we also find a positive and significant 
relationship  between  civic  participation  (GROUP)  and  only  one  measure  of  civic  co-
operation, namely a belief that it is never right to cheat on taxes (TAXCH) (r=.592, p=.020).
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Figure Two : Pearson correlation coefficients and levels of significance for 
social cohesion aggregates
  GENTR GROUP DEMTR TAXCH TRANC
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 GENTR Pearson 
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  N 15
 GROUP Pearson 
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  Sig. (2-
tailed)
.990 .
  N 15 15
 DEMTR Pearson 
Correlatio
n
.563* -.226 1
  Sig. (2-
tailed)
.029 .417 .
  N 15 15 15
 TAXCH Pearson 
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 RISK Pearson 
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 *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Figure Three : A “coherent syndrome”? Civic participation and general 
trust at the national level in the main dataset
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Figure Four : Civic participation and trust in an expanded dataset
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Taking trust (general and institutional), civic co-operation and crime as indicators of national 
level social cohesion arguably makes good sense. Crime is a traditional negative indicator 
that would be readily recognized as valid by policy-makes and people in general in many 
cultures. One could hardly imagine it being said high levels of violent crime were a marker of 
social cohesion at the societal level, although it might be argued that they are compatible with 
certain kinds of group solidarity.  In our analysis, we find that individuals at least consider 
that  they  are  less  at  risk  of  crime  in  more  trusting  communities,  although  this  does  not 
necessarily correlate with observed crime rates (although there is some debate in the literature 
as to whether recorded or perceived crime is a better indicator of actual crime rates : Van 
Kesteren, Mayhew and Nieuwbeerta, 2000). Civic co-operation is also intuitively connected 
to social cohesion, at  least in principle.  People may sometimes massage their  tax returns, 
break speed limits and jump the lights at crossings, but they will generally admit that these 
are not socially responsible things to do, and lament their increasing prevalence. Social and 
institutional trust seem to go together since trusting in institutions involves trusting in people 
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(although there may be societies where ordinary people trust each other but not officials in 
institutions). Social trust has also proved to be a reasonably robust measure in various studies 
and, according to Norris (2001), is the main driver of the often cited links between social 
capital and growth and democratic stability. 
Repeated  WVS  surveys  show  substantial  and  durable  differences  between  countries  on 
average levels of trust (Inglehart, 1990). The WVS ‘Trust’ question  (‘Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people’)  has  been criticized  on the  grounds  that  it  is  impossible  to  know whether  those 
answering it  are expressing their trust in close friends and family or the wider society of 
individuals.  However,  a  number  of  factors  suggest  that  it  is  general  trust  that  is  being 
measured.  As Knack and Keefer (19997) show, trust values across countries in the WVS 
correlate closely with the results of the Readers’ Digest ‘dropped wallet’ test for a range of 
countries.  They  also  correspond  closely  with  the  stable  results  of  repeated  Euobaromter 
surveys  asking individuals  whether  people  from other  specified  countries  are  trustworthy 
(Ingelhart,  1990).6 Furthermore the very low proportion of those expressing trust in some 
countries in WVS  (ten per cent in Brazil) also suggests that the question is not measuring 
narrow radius trust. 
It is quite possible that cross-country variations in positive responses to the trust question are 
measuring simultaneously differences in both trusting and trustworthiness,  but this  hardly 
matters since trust is understood as a component of social cohesion precisely as a relational, 
dynamic  and  institutionally  dependent  phenomena.  Trust  breeds  trust;  distrust,  distrust. 
Trustworthy people are likely to generate trust among others with whom they are in contact, 
and  untrustworthy  people  the  opposite.  Societies  where  honesty  and  reliability  are 
underpinned by social norms and institutional codes are more likely to be trusting societies 
because people are more likely to experience reasons to be trusting. Trust is thus measured as 
an individual attribute but its aggregated value points to societal features. As Alan Fox puts 
it: trust and distrust ‘are embedded in the rules, roles, and relations which men impose on, or 
seek to get accepted, by others’ (Fox, 1974, p.67).  
6 Eurobarometer surveys in 1976 and 1986 asked respondents in 9 European countries how far they trusted 
people in other named countries. The rank ordering on country’s perceived trustworthiness was the same in both 
years with the Swiss, the Danes and the Dutch being most trusted and the Irish, Italians and Russians being least 
trusted. America, Britain and France lay in the middle (Inglehart, 1990, p. 399)
26
Correlation between Education and Social Cohesion Measures
In order to test the correlations across countries between education and our measures of social 
cohesion  we  need  some  valid  national  measures  of  education.  Years  of  schooling 
measures used in WVS, our main dataset, are rejected, because length of schooling is a 
poor indicator of quality of learning and skills acquired. We therefore use the data on 
literacy  in  the  International  Adult  Literacy  survey  (IALS).  This  survey  has  been 
criticised by some (Blum, Goldstein, and Guϑrein-Pace, 2001) for cultural bias, but it at 
least has the merit of attempting to provide direct measures of skill, rather than proxies 
such as  schooling  years  or  qualifications.   One may assume that  the  skills  that  it  is 
measuring are related to both the quantity and quality of the education received. 
As figure 5 (below) shows there are no significant correlations (P<0.05) across countries in 
the main dataset between aggregates for education levels (PROUS – the mean level of 
upper-secondary  attainment  in  literacy)  and  measures  for  social  cohesion  (GROUP; 
DEMTR; GENTR; TAXCH; TRANCH; CRIME; RISK) (athough there is  a  positive 
correlation between this variable and tolerance (TOLER), which we have not included 
here as a social cohesion measure). This should be no surprise given what we have said 
already  about  the  likelihood  that  national  cultural  and  institutional  factors  greatly 
outweigh  gross  education  effects  on  social  cohesion.  We  therefore  look  next  at  the 
impact  of  educational  inequality  on  social  cohesion,  on  the  basis  that  comparative 
historical and theoretical literature suggests that social cohesion is highly sensitive to 
distributional effects.   
Figure Five : Pearson correlation coefficients and levels of significance for 
mean level of upper secondary attainment and social cohesion aggregates
Correlations
  GENTR GROUP DEMTR TAXCH TRANCH CRIME TOLERRISK
 PROUS Pearson 
Correlatio
n
.354 -.120 .244 -.376 -.487 -.055 .491 -.505
  Sig. (2-
tailed)
.196 .670 .381 .167 .066 .845 .063 .078
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 13
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Educational Inequality and Social Cohesion
 
We have used results from all cycles of the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) in 
order to ascertain the distribution of educational outcomes, in terms of literacy skills, across a 
number  of countries  also included in the World Values Survey (WVS).  Using a similar 
methodology to Nickell and Layard (1998, p.67) we calculated a test score ratio based on the 
differences  between  the  average  literacy  levels  of  those  who  attended  the  minimal 
compulsory education  for that  country and those who continued their  education after  the 
upper secondary level.  Following the method used by the OECD (2000) when assessing the 
social consequences of inequalities in literacy, we used the prose measure of literacy rather 
than  the  quantitative  measure  of  literacy  employed  by Nickell  and Layard  (1998,  p.67). 
There may be questions about the suitability of these measures, or a combined measure as a 
proxy for skill distribution in the labour market, and this is an issue for further debate.  
TABLE 3 : MEAN PROFICIENCY SCORES AND TEST-SCORE RATIO FOR 
COUNTRIES IN SAMPLE
COUNTRY PROLESUS PROUS PROTERT P3
Australia 250.60 280.00 310.40 1.24
Belgium 242.50 281.00 312.30 1.29
Britain 247.90 281.90 309.50 1.25
Canada 233.40 283.80 314.80 1.35
Denmark 252.80 278.10 298.50 1.18
Finland 261.60 295.90 316.90 1.21
Ireland 238.80 288.20 308.30 1.29
Netherlands 257.50 297.00 312.10 1.21
Norway 254.50 284.40 315.10 1.24
Poland 210.50 252.70 277.30 1.32
Portugal 206.60 291.50 304.80 1.48
Sweden 275.40 302.30 329.10 1.19
Switzerland 228.10 274.10 298.30 1.31
USA 207.10 270.70 308.40 1.49
Germany 265.60 283.80 310.10 1.17
Table 3 shows the mean prose scores for those whose educational level is less than upper 
secondary (PROLEUS), for those who have attained upper secondary education (PROUS) 
and for those who have attained some tertiary education (PROTERT).  The test score ratio 
(P3)  is  the  ratio  of  the  score  of  those  attaining  tertiary  education  (PROTERT)  to  those 
attaining lower than upper secondary education (PROLEUS).  Hence it is the ratio between 
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the level of attainment of those who have experienced  post-compulsory education and those 
who have attained the lowest level of secondary education.
The results show that measures of inequality in skills outcomes are rather higher in English-
speaking countries such as the UK, the USA and Canada than in some northern continental 
and Nordic countries such as Germany and Sweden. The relative positions of countries here 
confirm some of the findings on skills spreads by Brown, Mickelright and Waldmann (2000), 
based on analysis of IEA data for test scores at 14, and Green and Sakamoto (1999) based on 
adult distributions of qualifications.   
If  we then  correlate  national  measures  of  skills  distribution  against  national  measures  of 
social cohesion (Figure 6) we find that there is a significant (p<0.05) correlation (r=-.592, 
p=.020)  between  educational  inequality  (P3)  and  one  commonly  used  measure  of  social 
capital, the general level of trust (GENTRUST).  Hence, the higher the level of educational 
inequality, the lower the level of general trust.
Figure  Six  :  Pearson  correlation  coefficients  and  levels  of  significance  for  distribution  of  
educational attainments and social cohesion aggregates
  GENTR GROUP DEMTR TAXCH TRANCH CRIME TOLER RISK
 P3 Pearson 
Correlation
-.592* .333 -.283 .265 .171 .398 -.060 .404
  Sig. (2-
tailed)
.020 .225 .307 .340 .543 .142 .831 .171
 N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 13
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
However, membership (GROUP), Putnam’s key measure of social capital, does not correlate 
positively with educational equality. In fact in this case the effect of the education variable, 
which is below the .5 per cent significance level, appears if anything to be reversed, so that 
number of memberships, for instance, show a positive correlation with educational inequality 
(r=.333, although not significant at the 5% level). This finding, though interesting in itself, 
need not trouble our thesis since association is not taken to be a measure of national level 
social cohesion.
Education and income inequality
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If  educational  equality  correlates  with  social  cohesion,  at  least  in  terms  of  general  trust, 
across countries, how does this association work?  Our model hypothesised that education 
impacts on social cohesion both directly through socialization effects and indirectly through 
effects  of  skills  distributions  on  income  distributions.  We  are  unable  to  test  for  the 
socialization effects since we have no measures for ‘effective’ socialization outcomes. In any 
case average levels of education in our correlation not does show any association with social 
cohesion outcomes. We can, however, test the effects of educational distributions on income 
distributions and we do this using a method adapted from Nickell and Layard (1988).  
In  measuring the degree to which skill differentials correspond to income inequality, Nickell 
and  Layard  (1998)  employ  earnings  ratios,  the  ratio  of  incomes  between  individuals  of 
differing educational levels.  In this paper, we employ gini coefficients which are a more 
general measure of earnings inequality for the whole population.  Gini coefficients employed 
are provided in table 4 (below). 
Table Four : GINI COEFFICIENTS (MID 1990S)
COUNTRY GINI
Australia 35.20
Belgium 25.00
Britain 36.10
Canada 31.50
Denmark 24.70
Finland 25.60
Ireland 35.90
Netherlands 32.60
Norway 25.80
Poland 32.90
Portugal 35.60
Sweden 25.00
Switzerland 33.10
USA 40.80
Germany 30.00
Source : World Bank (2001)
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Figure 7 shows the relationship between educational inequality, measured by the test score 
ratio  P3  and  each  of  the  fifteen  countries  in  our  sample.  As  can  be  seen,  there  is  an 
association  between  distributions  of  literacy  skills  and  income  inequality  in  these  15 
economies.   Economies  with  a  high degree  of  skill  disparity,  also  have  high degrees  of 
income inequality and vice-versa.  As shown in figure 7, there is a clear relationship between 
the test score ratio (P3) and the gini coefficient.  This relationship is statistically significant 
(p<0.01) with a positive and large correlation coefficient (r=.650, p=.009).
Figure Seven: Educational Inequality and Income inequality
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Income inequality and social cohesion 
The next stage in the model requires that we test whether there is an association between 
income inequality and social  cohesion.  Putnam (1993, 2000, p. 360-1) found that income 
inequality and aggregate social capital correlated across regions in both Italy and the USA, 
although he made little analytical use of this empirical finding, consigning its mention to a 
footnote in Making emocracy Work. We seek here to find whether this applies at the national 
level and with which measures of social capital. In order to do this we employed the 1990 and 
1995  sweeps  of  the  World  Values  Survey  to  calculate  measures  of  general  trust  and 
association.   Following Knack and Keefer (1997) our measure of trust  was based on the 
percentage of individuals in each country who answered ‘yes’ to the question whether people 
in general can be trusted.  The association measure employed was the average number of 
memberships of various associations for each country.  These associations included church, 
religious, art, music and educational organizations, unions, political parties, environmental 
organizations, charitable organizations and other voluntary organizations.
Figure 8 provides the results of the analysis of correlations between income inequality and 
our social cohesion aggregates.  For the fifteen countries in the main dataset we failed to find 
a  significant  relationship  between  income  inequality  and  associational  membership. 
However,  a significant  positive relationship between income inequality  and violent  crime 
(CRIME) (r=.640, p=.010) and the perceived risk (RISK) of assult in the community (r=.636, 
p=.020)  was  identified  in  addition  to  a  significant  negative  relationship  between  income 
inequality  and  general  trust  (r=-.547,  p=.035).   Scatterplots  show  descriptively  the 
relationship between income inequality, crime (figure 9) and general trust (figure 10).    
 
Figure Eight : Pearson correlation coefficients and levels of significance for 
distribution of income and social cohesion aggregates
Correlations
  GENTR GROUP DEMTR TAXCH TRANCH CRIME RISK TOLER
 GINI
 
Pearson 
Correlation
-.547* .414 -.305 .403 -.009 .640* .636* .240
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.035 .125 .269 .136 .975 .010 .020 .389
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  N 15 15 15 15 15 15 13 15
 *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Figure Nine : Income  inequality and general trust
Figure Ten : Income inequality and crime
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Income inequality and general trust
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Income inequality and violent crime
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In  order  to  explore  further  the  relationship  between  income  inequality  and  associational 
membership, we expanded our range of countries to include the ‘market economies’ used by 
Knack and Keefer. We find a weak but significantly positive relationship between income 
inequality and association, with average group memberships highest in those countries that 
have the highest degree of income inequalities. As figure 11 shows, this relationship may be 
unduly influenced by a number of outlying countries, particularly MDCs and LDCs with high 
levels  of  income  inequality  and  high  levels  of  civic  participation.  However,  even  if  we 
remove these countries (Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Nigeria) from our sample, and also the 
USA which is another outlier, a weak positive, but significant, relationship between income 
inequality and social capital remains (r=.514, p=0.02).  What we may be seeing here is the 
effect  of  associational  activity  undertaken  to  offset  social  grievances.  This  seemingly 
paradoxical relationship may cause us to question the supposed autonomy of civil society 
from economic relationships (Marx and Engels 1976 : 62-65) or at least the vested economic 
interests of social groupings (Olson, 1971) which is conspicuously absent from social capital 
theorizing.
Using the expanded dataset, we also find that the negative relationship between income 
inequality and general trust is maintained – that is countries with more unequal distributions 
of income are also those in which there is less agreement that people in general can be trusted 
from the WVS (r=-.655, p=<0.001). The relationship between income inequality and general 
trust is shown in figure 12. 
The findings here on the effects of income inequality on national levels of trust confirms 
other findings by Knack and Keefer (1997) that income equality (with, in their case, value 
consensus  as  proxied  by  measures  of  ethnic  homogeneity)  provides  the  best  statistical 
explanation of cross-national patterns of variation.  The findings on the effects of income 
inequality on violent crime also parallel the findings of criminologists on violent crime across 
countries (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 1980; McMahon, 1999; Messner, 1982; Wilkinson, 
1996).  Braithwaite  and  Braithwaite  (1980)  showed  a  statistically  significant  correlation 
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between greater inequality of earnings and higher homicide rates. Messner (1982) found that 
the extent of income inequality accounted for 35 per cent of the differences in homicide rates 
among the 39 countries  for which he had data.  Taken together  these results  suggest that 
income inequality is an important factor in social cohesion. Our results here on the positive 
relation between inequality and association (of any type) also add support to our argument 
that association works in a different way from other social capital measures at the national 
level and should not be considered as a measure of social cohesion.  
Figure  Eleven  :  Income  inequality  and  civic  participation  (“social  capital”)  in  an 
expanded dataset
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Figure Twelve : Income inequality and general trust in an expanded dataset
gini coefficient
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Educational inequality, income inequality and social cohesion
We can now look at both stages of the model together. If one regards income inequality as a 
mediator between educational inequality and social cohesion measures then the explanatory 
power of some of the causal pathways may be improved.  Figure 13 below posits a model 
whereby the effects of educational inequality are transmitted through income inequality and 
thereby to measures of social cohesion.  In this model, GNP per capita is used as a control, 
hence  the  correlation  coefficients  presented  are  “partial”  correlation  coefficients.  The 
measure  of  GDP  per  capita  used  was  taken  from  the  Purchasing  Power  Parity  Index 
employed by the World Bank (1996, pp. 188-189).  After introducing controls, the partial 
correlation coefficients between income inequality and general trust (GENTRUST) (r=-.526, 
p=.037) remain significant.   As before, we find that inequality decreases general trust but 
increases violent crime (CRIME) (r=.660, r=.010) and increases perceptions of risk of crime 
(RISK) (r=.628, p=.029).  We also find that controlling for GNP per capita means that the 
association between income inequality and civic participation becomes significant (r=.595, 
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p=.025).  Hence, even in our reduced sample, it is possible to locate a positive relationship 
between income inequality and civic participation.
Figure Thirteen :  Pearson correlation coefficients and levels of significance 
for distribution of income and social cohesion aggregates with 
controls for GNP / capita
Correlations
  GENTR GROUP DEMTR TAXCH TRANCH CRIME TOLER RISK
 GINI
 
Pearson 
Correlation
-.562* .595* -.032 .430 -.004 .660* .270 .628*
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.037 .025 .293 .125 .989 .010 .350 .029
 N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Some Conclusions
 
The  analysis  above  leads  to  a  number  of  tentative  conclusions  regarding  the  effects  of 
education on social cohesion at the national level. 
First, the measurement of social cohesion at the national level requires different combinations 
of indicators from those normally used in social  capital  analysis.  While association,  trust, 
tolerance,  civic  cooperation  and  political  engagement  may  form  a  coherent  cluster  of 
variables at the individual level in certain countries, they do not co-vary sufficiently at the 
national level to be considered measures of a single underlying phenomena. In particular, 
associational membership would seem to work quite differently from other variables at the 
national  level  and appears  to  be  a  poor  correlate  of  national  social  cohesion.  We would 
suggest, as indicated earlier, that this is because associational membership involves so many 
different  types  of  social  relations  that  have  quite  different  effects  in  terms  of  social 
integration.  Used  purely  quantitatively,  membership  has  very  little  meaning  in  terms  of 
cohesion at community or national levels. Whatever the salience of de Tocqueville’s original 
(qualitative) argument about the importance of the vibrant of community association for a 
strong civil society, quantitative approaches to this, which are unable to distinguish between 
narrow and self-interested association and more encompassing and consensus-building forms 
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of association, are of little use in looking at modes of social integration in the modern world. 
Second, there would appear to be a set of variables which do co-vary at the national level and 
which may form the basis for measurement of social cohesion. These include social and 
institutional trust from the original social capital measures, and also perception of crime 
crime, which is a more conventional measure of social cohesion. Civic cooperation may 
also be associated although our own analysis here has not sought to confirm Knack and 
Keefer's findings on this point. We would suggest that other conventional measures of 
societal  cohesion  and conflict  –  such as  tolerance,  national  pride,  rates  of  industrial 
conflict  and  incidents  of  inter-ethnic  violence  –  need  further  testing  and  theoretical 
discussion before being included as positive or negative measures of social cohesion.
Third, there appears to be no significant correlation at the national level between aggregate 
levels of education and social cohesion, using our measures. This confirms our earlier 
argument  that  education  effects  may  well  be  greatly  outweighed  by  more  powerful 
institutional and cultural factors at the national level. However, this does not mean that 
the role of education is insignificant. Education may have an important effect through 
way in which it socialises young people, which is invisible in our crude measures of 
educational outcomes. As we show here, it would certainly appear to have a significant 
indirect effect through its impact on equality.   
Fourth, inequality of educational outcomes is closely connected to income inequality which 
has a powerful effect on many of the measures of social cohesion, although we cannot be 
clear yet about which way all the causal arrows run. 
It is quite probable that income equality impacts on educational equality through equalizing 
access to education.  It is also likely that social cohesion and solidaristic cultures and 
political  ideologies  promote  both  income  equality  and  educational  equality  through 
equalising  aspirations  and supporting certain  types  of policy interventions.  Minimum 
wages and other forms of labour market regulation that make wage agreements binding 
and inclusive for entire sectors may well, for instance, enhance income equality (Blau 
and Kahn, 1996;  Nickell  and Layard,  1988).  Measures  to  equalise  resources  for and 
admissions  to  schools  may  make  educational  outcomes  more  equal,  as  may  shared 
aspirations about the value of schooling, as has been argued in the case of the – at least  
until  recently  -  highly  egalitarian  Japanese  education  system  (Green,  1999).  These 
relationships remain to be investigated analytically, but our analysis here of correlations 
at least suggests that there is an issue to be explored.     
Existing models of education effects on social capital and civic participation (Bynner and 
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Ashford, 1994; Nie et al, 1996; Emler and Frazer, 1999; Preston and Green forthcoming) 
suggest that education impacts on association and political engagement directly by conferring 
useful  cognitive  resources  and indirectly  by giving  access  to  jobs  which  confer  network 
centrality (as shown in figure 14). Our model here in no way contradicts this but rather seeks 
to explain educational impacts on a different kind of outcome - ie social cohesion. In this 
model skills and qualifications are still important, but it is mainly the way they are distributed 
which affects social cohesion. In addition to this we posit, but do not explore, the possibility 
that different forms of school socialisation may have differential impacts on social cohesion 
at the national level. The full hypothesised model is shown below in figure 15 below.
Figure fourteen : Learning effects on social capital (joining, volunteering 
and engagement)
 
Status        Network centrality
Learning Joining
volunteering
civic engagement
Cognitive resources 
(knowledge, skills etc)
Adapted from R. Nie
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Figure fifteen : Learning effects on social cohesion
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The model sketched above clearly requires a great deal more testing and causal explanation 
than  can  be  attempted  here.  However,  we  do  suggest  that  this  would  be  a  worthwhile 
endeavour. If proved valid, this model of educational effects on social cohesion would have 
significant policy implications. 
Current  Citizenship  education  policies  in  England  (and  some  other  English-speaking 
countries) focus strongly on the development of social competences (Kerr, 1999; Osler and 
Starkey,  2000). This may well be beneficial  for association and political  engagement,  but 
may have rather less impact on trust, civic cooperation and social  cohesion generally.  To 
address  these  issues  through  education  more  attention  would  have  to  be  placed  on  the 
development  of  shared  or  cooperative  values  and  on  the  attenuation  inequalities  in 
educational outcomes.
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APPENDIX 1 : DERIVATION OF COUNTRY LEVEL INDICATORS
As no one data set could satisfy the types of international comparisons required, a combined data set was 
constructed using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), International Adult Learning Survey (IALS), 
World Bank, Interpol statistics and the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS).  All data used was from the 
years 1990-2000.  A copy of the dataset and correlation matrices used in the analysis can be obtained from the 
authors.  Fifteen countries were included in the core data set being Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and Germany.
Social cohesion measures were obtained from the most recent country sweep available of the WVS.  In most 
cases, data used was from the 1995-1997 sweep, although when data for these years was not available, data 
from the 1990 sweep was substituted.  
General Trust (GENTR) was measured by the percentage of individuals sampled in each country who agreed 
that most people could be trusted when asked:-
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?” (WVS question V27)
Associational memberships (GROUP) was measured by the mean number of associational memberships for 
sampled individuals in each country, not including memberships of sporting associations (WVS questions V28 
and V30-V36)
Trust in government (DEMTR) was measured by the percentage of individuals sampled in each country who 
agreed or strongly agreed that they had confidence in their parliament (WVS question V144).
Civic co-operation measures cheating on public transport fares (TRANSC) and cheating on taxes (TAXCH) 
were measured by the percentage of individuals in each country who stated that such actions were never 
justifiable (WVS questions V193 and V194).
The measure of educational inequality (P3) was obtained from IALS secondary data by dividing the mean prose 
score of those individuals who had completed tertiary education by the mean prose score of those who had 
completed upper secondary education only.  To compute these scores, we utilized the most recent sweep of 
IALS data (IALS, 2000).
Measures of income inequality (GINI) and GNP per capita (GNPCAPIT) were taken from the most recently 
available World Bank Statistics (World Bank, 2001, pg.282-283).
The measure of crime (CRIME) was obtained from Interpol statistics for 1996 (International Criminal Police 
Organisation, 1996).  The measure of crime used being the sum of homicides, robberies and violent thefts per. 
10,000 inhabitants.
The measure of tolerance (TOLER) was obtained from question V57 of the WVS and measures the percentage 
of respondents in each country who would not mind having an immigrant as a neighbour.
The measure of perceived risk of crime (RISK) was obtained from the mid-1990s, or most recent possible, 
sweep of the ICVS (International Crime Victims Survey) and measures the mean score for each country from 
respondents feelings of safety when walking alone after dark in the area (very safe=1, very unsafe=4).  Figures 
were not available for Germany and Norway and so these countries were not included in analysis involving this 
variable.
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Table Five : Social capital / cohesion aggregates for fifteen countries (main dataset)
COUNTRY ABBREVIA GENTR GROUP DEMTR TAXCH TRANCH CRIME TOLER RISK
Norway NW 64.80 .61 69.50 47.50 70.20 31.26 81.75 N/A
Denmark DEN 57.70 .18 42.00 57.30 74.50 47.69 88.95 1.67
Sweden SW 56.60 .52 44.60 49.30 47.00 85.38 95.34 1.68
Netherlands NL 55.80 .36 51.60 42.90 55.80 121.46 88.64 1.83
Canada CAN 50.70 .47 37.90 59.20 61.90 109.21 94.30 1.78
Finland FIN 46.90 .32 32.40 57.40 62.60 45.42 85.44 1.77
Ireland IRL 46.80 .23 50.30 48.80 57.50 96.88 93.78 1.99
Germany D 41.80 .54 29.40 40.10 38.60 86.92 95.60 N/A
Australia AU 39.90 1.06 30.60 62.10 62.80 37.38 95.42 2.25
Switzerland SZ 37.80 .68 43.90 53.70 59.30 34.40 89.99 1.87
USA US 35.00 1.63 30.30 73.60 66.50 209.85 90.31 1.95
Poland PO 34.50 .03 34.50 55.20 68.10 71.04 75.89 2.29
Belgium B 30.60 .28 42.80 33.90 57.70 29.84 82.28 1.89
Britain UK 29.10 .20 46.10 53.90 59.40 144.83 88.30 2.10
Portugal POR 20.70 .19 33.50 39.90 53.40 62.57 90.53 2.18
In addition to our main dataset, we also made use of an expanded dataset of 38 countries broadly corresponding 
to Knack and Keefers (1997) set of market economies.  Data was pooled from WVS sweeps of 1990 and 1995 
to arrive at figures for general trust (GENTRUST) and civic participation (GROUPS) using the methods 
described above.  Corresponding measures of income inequality (GINI) were obtained from World Bank 
statistics, but note that for five countries (Argentina, East Germany, Iceland, Taiwan, Ukraine) reliable gini 
coefficients were not available.  Data for countries in the expanded dataset is provided in table 6.
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Table Five : Social capital / cohesion aggregates for thirty-eight countries (expanded dataset)
COUNTRY ABBREVIATION GENTRUST GROUPS GINI
Argentina ARG 17.10 .43 N/A
Australia AU 39.90 1.06 35.20
Austria A 28.40 .21 23.10
Belgium B 30.60 .28 25.00
Brazil BRZ 2.80 .91 60.00
Britain UK 29.10 .20 36.10
Bulgaria BUL 23.70 .11 28.30
Canada CAN 50.70 .47 31.50
Chile CHI 21.90 .68 56.50
Denmark DEN 57.70 .18 24.70
East Germany EGe 24.90 .40 N/A
Finland FIN 46.90 .32 25.60
France FR 22.80 .23 32.70
Hungary HUN 23.80 .15 30.80
Iceland ICE 41.70 .30 N/A
India IND 33.00 .53 37.80
Ireland IRL 46.80 .23 35.90
Italy I 33.80 .22 27.30
Japan J 43.40 .27 24.90
Mexico MX 26.40 1.10 53.70
Netherlands NL 55.80 .36 32.60
Norway NW 64.80 .61 25.80
Peru PER 4.90 .58 46.20
Phillipines PHI 5.50 .42 46.20
Poland PO 34.50 .03 32.90
Portugal POR 20.70 .19 35.60
Russia RUS 23.40 .14 48.70
South Africa SA 17.60 1.15 59.30
South Korea SK 30.30 .45 31.60
Spain E 28.70 .41 32.50
Sweden SW 56.60 .52 25.00
Switzerland SZ 37.80 .68 33.10
Taiwan TAI 40.20 .36 N/A
Ukraine UKR 28.80 .09 N/A
USA US 35.00 1.63 40.80
West Germany D 41.80 .54 30.00
Nigeria NI 19.47 .59 50.60
Turkey TU 5.49 .22 41.50
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